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Abstract - This paper presents an analysis with the aim to investigate the EU regional 
policy and in particular to consider how it has impacted on national states authority. 
The original point of this work consists in constructing an index to rank the power of 
regions in each state that consider the total  Regional Policy funds allocation in the 
sample 2000-2006 and the indicative financial allocation for the sample 2007-2013. 
 The idea behind this index is that powerful regions will be able to protect their 
interests in the allocating process. Thus, we can “measure” the power of regions, 
indirectly, by mean of the loss bore by them in the re-negotiating process. At this 
purpose it is important to underline that enlargement had as concomitant result that the 
regional disparities have doubled, so that the challenge for each region (and each state) 
is becoming very strong. Thus, the power of region (where and if it exists)  has to 
emerge with particular evidence in this context.  
 In this work I propose an analysis that may be thought as divided into two main 
parts. The first one with the aim to provide a synthesis of the main results achieved  in 
literature about this issue and in particular the debate between Multilevel-Governance 
and State Centric literature. In a second part, as I said before, I investigate the empirical 
evidence concerning the EU model of governance with particular attention to the EU 
regional policy. 
 The empirical evidence here considered is consistent with some assertion provided 
by Multilevel Governance literature. 
 2
Proposal for a measure of regional power in EU15  
in the 2007-2013 bargain  
 
 
 
 
Abstract - This paper presents an analysis with the aim to investigate the EU regional 
policy and in particular to consider how it has impacted on national states authority. 
The original point of this work consists in constructing an index to rank the power of 
regions in each state that consider the total  Regional Policy funds allocation in the 
sample 2000-2006 and the indicative financial allocation for the sample 2007-2013. 
 The idea behind this index is that powerful regions will be able to protect their 
interests in the allocating process. Thus, we can “measure” the power of regions, 
indirectly, by mean of the loss bore by them in the re-negotiating process. At this 
purpose it is important to underline that enlargement had as concomitant result that the 
regional disparities have doubled, so that the challenge for each region (and each state) 
is becoming very strong. Thus, the power of region (where and if it exists)  has to 
emerge with particular evidence in this context.  
 In this work I propose an analysis that may be thought as divided into two main 
parts. The first one with the aim to provide a synthesis of the main results achieved  in 
literature about this issue and in particular the debate between Multilevel-Governance 
and State Centric literature. In a second part, as I said before, I investigate the empirical 
evidence concerning the EU model of governance with particular attention to the EU 
regional policy. 
 The empirical evidence here considered is consistent with some assertion provided 
by Multilevel Governance literature. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I analyse the European Model of governance with particular respect to 
the EU regional Policy1 and to the states that became Member before the last two 
enlargement on May 2004 and January 2007. According to Bache(1996) writing this paper 
I asked my self: Who has the power to do what in the EU regional Policy?. But not only, 
indeed, I tried to find a method to “measure” the power of regions in each state. 
 A Manichean approach to this issue is constituted by the consideration of only two 
feasible model of governance: Multilevel Governance or State Centric governance. 
                                                 
1 This choice should not appear strange since the term Multilevel Governance was introduced by  Marks 
(1993) in the field of studies of the European Community and of the EU just at the precise purpose to 
characterise the European Community regional and structural policy.  
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According to the Multilevel Governance model, as result of European integration, authority 
and policy-making in EU are shared across multiple levels of government such as sub 
national actors, national actors and supranational actors. This is equivalent to assert that EU 
institutions have an autonomous role in shaping the EU regional policy. Vice versa, 
according to the State Centric model, European integration does not challenge the 
autonomy of nation-state. This literature argues that supranational institutions exist only 
with the purpose to facilitate agreements but the power in the decision making process is 
ever in the hands of the Nation-state. European Institution are only instruments used by 
Member State, so we have to see the State as ultimate decision maker.  
 In what follow I refer principally to Hooghe and Marks (1996) work about Multi-
level Governance and European integration to provide a political main stream theoretical 
framework. Regarding this point I suggest that the debate between Multi-level and State 
Centric model may be described in term of decision making costs using the framework 
introduced by Public Choice theory (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). This different approach 
has the advantage to put the question in an intuitively manner without loss of generality. 
 Once provided the main framework, I continue the analysis considering the 
empirical evidence of the EU regional policy and in particular the allocation of EU 
Cohesion funds. Obviously, there many relevant factors that play a role in the allocation 
process (efficiency, lobbies, Gross Domestic Product level, etc.) but the idea here 
developed is that “older” Member State with powerful regions should be able to achieve a 
lower loss in the bargaining process. It is not casual that I refer to the loss concept; indeed, 
because of the recent enlargement processes the “first generation” Member State lost part of 
their previous financial aid from the EU, but the amount of this loss is different across them 
in a sensitive manner.     
 The novelty presented in the present paper is the introduction of a (way to) 
“measure” the power of  regions using data concerning the result of the funds allocation 
process. It is evident that this is a very coarse method, but in my point of view it may be an 
useful start point for further analysis.   
 For example, the list obtained using this method is consistent to what Bomberg and 
Peterson (1998) argue about the “role of sub-national authorities in  the European Union 
Decision Making (process)”. In their paper they focus on the different power of regions in 
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United Kingdom and in Germany arguing that the former state has less powerful regions 
(also) because of  a different constitutional framework2. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 preliminary results achieved in 
literature about models of governance in EU are presented; in section 3  I point to the 
relevance of the Public Choice framework of “Decision Making” process as valid 
alternative approach. Section 4 briefly shows data concerning empirical evidence about 
Regional Policy and provide the construction of the regional “power-index”. Some 
comments and concluding remarks are provided in section 5.  
  
2. Literature review 
 
Before starting with the analysis of the empirical evidence I would like, very briefly, 
provide a theoretical framework. At this purpose we can refer to a dualistic approach using 
two models: Multilevel-governance versus State Centric model. 
 According to State Centric model European Integration does not challenge the 
autonomy of nation-state because supranational institutions exist to facilitate agreements 
but we have to see the State as ultimate decision maker. 
 What state-centric theorists argue is that EU institution like, for example, Council of 
Ministers, camouflage state sovereignty without undermine it. Moreover, by mean of EU 
institution the state power is increased3 or at least non reduced (see, for example, the veto 
power).   
 According to Multilevel Governance theorists, instead, as result of European 
integration authority and policy-making in EU are shared across multiple levels of 
government such as sub national actors, national actors and supranational actors. EU 
institutions have an autonomous role in shaping the EU regional policy. Nevertheless, it is 
important underline that the Multilevel Governance theory4 the state remain the most 
important actor but not the unique. At this purpose are invoked many problem in maintain 
                                                 
2 In their paper they consider many other factor like informal channels, general coalition building, national 
coalition building, etc.   
3 They use the difference between zero-sum power conception and positive-sum power conception referring to 
the latter. 
4 Jordan (2001) (cited in Bache (1998)) identifies seven key criticism of multi-level governance as applied to 
EU. One of these is that  it provide a description but it is not a theory. 
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the whole control of policy in the EU arena: principal-agent problem, coalition building, 
imperfect information.  
In this field it was argued that  “The European Commission has […] sought to exploit the 
implementation of structural fund spending in order to further cause of multilevel 
governance in the EU encouraging the participation of regional and local 
government…”(Allen, 2005). How successful was this action? 
 General speaking, structural funds is giving a greater role to regional institutions in 
the administration of public policies: regionalism is view as the best means of achieving 
cohesion, growth, competitiveness, sustainable development and employment.  
 Nevertheless, the primary rule governing the ERDF required unanimity in the 
Council. So we observe a strong State centric begin. 
 The SEA(1986) for the first time linked the idea of cohesion to the reduction of 
regional disparities. The basic parameters of this agreement were established by high-level 
intergovernmental bargaining. So we had still an empirical evidence of the State Centric 
model, at this stage. 
 The TEU(1991) retained the cohesion objective and extended the structural funds to 
include a new Cohesion fund. Remarkably it was established a Committee of Region 
(CoR), but required only that it be consulted with regard fund allocation and 
implementation (as the previous Consultative Council of regional local Authorities had 
only a consultative role). This Committee has struggled to play a significant role in EU 
policy-making and it was noted that variation in political influence between different actors 
are greater across countries than within them. 
 Thus, we can argue that the current institutional framework enable regional and 
local interest to participate in the implementation stage, but this should not be confused 
with multilevel governance, what we can say exist is only a multilevel participation. 
 In what follows, after introduced in section 3 a possible synthesis of the two approach, I 
propose a measure of the regional power in each state of the EU15. 
 
 
3.  A Public Choice interpretation of the EU model of Governance issues 
 
 A significant shift in approaching this issue may be obtained using a Public Choice’s framework. 
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 In this section I propose to use an analysis of the EU model of governance based on 
decision making costs shown by Buchanan and Tullock( 1962). At the end of this section I should 
demonstrated that this scheme, even if extremely concise with respect to the scheme developed 
above,  is “equivalent” to it in the sense that give us the same power of analysis using a more 
intuitive approach.  
The graph below represent costs related to a particular decision making process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DM curve represents decision-making costs, that is total of all bargaining efforts necessary 
for reaching a decision. The EC represent external costs. that is the sum of all disadvantages of 
different kinds that hit the voter as a consequence of a decision that  is not supported.  
It is clear that decision-making costs (or transaction costs) increase as the majority required 
for a decision increases. When the decision rule approaches unanimity the costs increase rapidly. As 
for the external costs it is obvious that, if unanimity is required for a decision, there can be no such 
costs at all. The external cost curve therefore has the value 0 for the decision rule 100% and 
decrease with increasing majority required for the decision. 
The sum of the decision-making costs and the expected external costs is called social 
interdependence costs (SI curve in the graph) and it has point of absolute minimum when DM curve 
match the EC curve. 
 Let assume that the government is able to represent the real DM curve, valid for any 
different actor (this assumption may be removed to complicate the analysis).  
Following this figure we can say that, according to the State Centric point of view, the EU 
institutions change only the position of the DM curve without  changing  decision maker; while, 
according to Multilevel Governance approach, EU institutions may change not only the position of 
the  DM curve, but also its form because of the change in actors involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1 
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Even if we reject part of Buchanan and Tullock's formalism some of the essentials remain 
however. Structural funds may be view in this framework. In particular, structural funds may be 
used to lower the EC curve, or may be used to change both DM (if we remove the previous 
assumption on DM curve)  and EC curve.  
 Indeed, considering that  EU structural funds budget is too small to have significant 
macroeconomic effect, it was argued that regional fund  policy  “…is essentially a justification for 
expenditure that is best thought of as compensation for the impact on a country or region of being 
part of a wider and integrated European economy”(Allen ,2005). But this not enough; changing our 
point of view, i.e. changing our approach,  we can start with many different analysis.  
One can be interested, for example, in “drawing” the exact DM curve using data on number 
of meeting, research and information required to achieve agreement in such particular issue. This is, 
obviously only a little suggestion for future researches. 
 
4. The empirical evidence: proposal for a measure of regional power 
 
In this section I propose an empirical analysis concerning the issue treated above.  It is 
important to point out that while theoretical models introduced distinguish four phases5 to 
investigate (potentially) each phase separately, in this analysis, only the final outcome of allocating 
process is observed. Thus, I will try to “photograph" the result trying also to reconstruct some 
information on the underlying dynamics. 
First of all let me introduce some data. The table 1 (page 8) shows the total indicative 
allocation of regional funds for the 2007-2013 period. In this table I put together data available 
separately (for each State) on the InfoRegio website. Data reports all type of regional funds 
allocated for the period 2007-2013 as “indicative allocation”. 
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5 Formulation, allocating, negotiation, implementation.  
  
Convergence  Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
European 
Territorial 
Cooperation
Total 
  
Cohesion 
Fund Convergence
Statistical 
phasing-
out  
Phasing-
in Competitiveness     
  CF CONV Ph-O Ph-I COMP TC   
         
         
         
Austria AT   177  1.027 257 1.461 
Belgium BE   638  1.425 194 2.257 
Bulgaria BG 2.283 4.391    179 6.853 
Cyprus CY 213   399  28 640 
Czech 
Republic CZ 8.819 17.064   419 389 26.691 
Germany DE  11.864 4.215  9.409 851 26.339 
Denmark DK     510 103 613 
Spain ES 3.543 21.054 1.583 4.955 3.522 559 35.216 
Estonia ET 1.152 2.252    52 3.456 
Finland FI    545 1.051 120 1.716 
France FR  3.191   10.257 872 14.320 
Greece GR 3.697 9.420 6.458 635  210 20.420 
Hungary HU 8.642 14.248  2.031  386 25.307 
Ireland IRL    458 293 151 902 
Italy IT  21.211 430 972 5.353 846 28.812 
Latvia LATV 1.540 2.991    90 4.621 
Lituania LT 2.305 4.470    109 6.884 
Luxembourg LX     50 15 65 
Malta ML 284 556    15 855 
The 
Netherlands NL     1.660 247 1.907 
Poland PL 22.176 44.377    731 67.284 
Portugal PT 3.060 17.133 280 448 490 99 21.510 
Romania RO 6.552 12.661    455 19.668 
Slovakia SK 3.899 7.013   449 227 11.588 
Slovenia SL 1.412 2.689    104 4.205 
Sweden SW     1.626 265 1.891 
United 
Kingdom UK   2.738 174 965 6.014 722 10.613 
         
overall EU 
27  69.577 199.323 13.955 11.408 43.555 8.276 346.094
         
         
         
notes         
Million EUR, current prices.       
Source: my elaboration of 
InfoRegio data       
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Graph 2 show the repartition of total funds among states(a) and program (b) 
Total Expenditure Ripartition
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK ES ET
FI FR GR HU IRL IT LATV LT LX
ML NL PL PT RO SK SL SW UK
 
 
Graph.2a 
 
Total composition
CF CONV Ph-O Ph-I COMP TC
 
 
Graph 2b 
Tab.1- total indicative allocation of regional funds for the 2007-2013 period. 
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For the purpose of this article it is most important to refer to a diverse re-elaboration of data 
available on InfoRegio. Table2 shows the total regional funds allocated in the 2000-2006 and the 
indicative allocation for the 2007-2013 period at 2004 prices to the end of comparison6. 
  
Total  
 
  2000-2006 2007-2013 variation variation 
  (A) (B) C=B-A D=(C/A)% 
Austria AT 1.930 1.297 -633 -32,80% 
Belgium BE 2.158 2.014 -144 -6,67% 
Bulgaria BG  6.032   
Cyprus CY 108 579 471 436,11% 
Czech 
Republic CZ 2.404 23.638 21.234 883,28% 
Germany DE 28.833 23.391 -5.442 -18,87% 
Denmark DK 688 544 -144 -20,93% 
Spain ES 54.671 31.457 -23.214 -42,46% 
Estonia ET 615 3.050 2.435 395,93% 
Finland FI 2.018 1.528 -490 -24,28% 
France FR 16.145 12.704 -3.441 -21,31% 
Greece GR 24.703 18.172 -6.531 -26,44% 
Hungary HU 2.837 22.395 19.558 689,39% 
Ireland IRL 4.113 813 -3.300 -80,23% 
Italy IT 28.801 25.583 -3.218 -11,17% 
Latvia LATV 1.031 4.080 3.049 295,73% 
Lituania LT 1.379 6.081 4.702 340,97% 
Luxembourg LX 99 58 -41 -41,41% 
Malta ML 81 759 678 837,04% 
The 
Netherlands NL 3.538 1.692 -1.846 -52,18% 
Poland PL 11.202 59.549 48.347 431,59% 
Portugal PT 22.496 19.099 -3.397 -15,10% 
Romania RO  17.273   
Slovakia SK 1.544 10.239 8.695 563,15% 
Slovenia SL 423 3.729 3.306 781,56% 
Sweden SW 2.194 1.678 -516 -23,52% 
United 
Kingdom UK 17.622 9.444 -8.178 -46,41% 
      
overall EU 27  231.633 306.878 51.940  
notes      
Million EUR, 
2004prices.      
Source: my 
elaboration of 
Inforegio data      
 
Tab. 2- total regional funds allocated in the 2000-2006 and the indicative allocation for the 2007-2013 
                                                 
6 Even if the same table regarding each state says that comparisons need to be made with great caution given 
the change in regional eligibility, and the number and nature of the objectives in the two programming 
periods, I think that the type of comparison that I am going to do has a sense because use the previous (2000-
2006) amount t achieve a relative measure and do not to compare directly the values. 
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A graph may be useful to approach data shown in Tab.2 The Graph 3 below shows the total 
amount of founds allocated in each state in the two periods considered. 
 
AT BG CZ DK ET FR HU IT LT M
L PL RO S
L UK
2000-2006 (A) 2007-2013 (B)
 
Graph.3 
 
The fifth column of Tab.2 shows the gain (achieved) or the loss (bore) by each state in that 
bargain process regarding the regional funds. It is evident that many factors and actors are involved 
in this process and it is really difficult to separate one from the other.  
 It is also evident that the enlargement on 1 May 2004 increased the population of the 
European Union by 20%, but the GDP by only 5% with a concomitant result that the regional 
disparities have doubled; thus, no one of New Member States contribute to increase the EU GDP. 
This means that the EU15 Member States has to bear a loss in the 2007-2013 period, but it is proper 
this facts that may stress the power of regions to manifest it self in order to do not loss “too much”. 
 All this empirical evidence may be put in an intuitive way looking at Graph.4 where 
negative and positive value separate also EU15 Member States and New Member States. 
Variation (C)
ES U
K
G
R D
E
FR P
T
IR
L IT N
L
AT SW
FI D
K BE L
X
C
Y
M
L
ET
LA
TV S
L LT SK H
U
C
Z PL
 
Graph.4 
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 Numbers shown in “C” column are a very coarse measure of this loss, “D” column, instead 
represents the “relative loss” and can be seen as a primitive “index” in the sense that it is ”net” from 
the structural variables (like efficiency in administrating regional funds) because of the relatively 
short period considered. I would say that only six years are not enough to radically change the 
ability (based on efficiency consideration) of such state to deal with the EU regional funds. Put 
differently, according to “D” column we compare each state with its previous performance, and 
even  if there will be great differences in efficiency across states,  with respect to the same state it is 
difficult to argue a radical change in efficiency considering a sample of only six years.  Thus, I 
suggest to interpret the difference as a primitive measure of the regional power. The higher the 
power of regions in each state the lower (will be) the loss bore by them.  
 The “game” I propose in order to measure the ability of regions in protect their interest is 
very simple. I ranked, increasingly, data available in Tab.2 according to the sixth column. Result are 
reported in Table3. 
  
Variation 
% 
Ireland -80,23%
The 
Netherlands -52,18%
United 
Kingdom -46,41%
Spain -42,46%
Luxembourg -41,41%
Austria -32,80%
Greece -26,44%
Finland -24,28%
Sweden -23,52%
France -21,31%
Denmark -20,93%
Germany -18,87%
Portugal -15,10%
Italy -11,17%
Belgium -6,67% 
Latvia 295,73%
Lituania 340,97%
Estonia 395,93%
Poland 431,59%
Cyprus 436,11%
Slovakia 563,15%
Hungary 689,39%
Slovenia 781,56%
Malta 837,04%
Czech R.  883,28%
 
Tab.3-Variation in funds allocation  
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How to interpret data shown in tab3.? First of all, we have to separate the positive value 
form the negative according to the reasoning developed above. Within the negative values an higher 
absolute value means a “weakness” of regions and vice versa. The idea is that central state is less 
“efficient” in protect regional financial interests than the region itself. So that, state are ordered in 
an increasingly way according to regional power within itself: where regional power is least –recall 
that our measure has lower absolute numbers for higher levels of regional power –regional  
performance is best.  
To provide a more intuitive measure in what follows I provide a table (Tab.4) where data 
about EU15 are normalised to 1 and ordered in increasingly order. Thus, in this table –differently to 
the former- states appear in direct correlation with regional power. In this sense I use “R” like an 
index of Regional power. It gives the same quality of information but in a different (and more 
intuitive) way. 
 
 R 
Belgium 0,01 
Italy 0,02 
Portugal 0,03 
Germany 0,04 
Denmark 0,05 
France 0,05 
Sweden 0,05 
Finland 0,05 
Greece 0,06 
Austria 0,07 
Luxembourg 0,09 
Spain 0,09 
United Kingdom 0,10 
The Netherlands 0,11 
Ireland 0,17 
    -------- 
 1,00 
 
Tab.5- R index 
 
 Note that the list is consistent, for example, with Bomberg and Peterson (1998) asserts that 
“British SNAs [Sub National Authority] have […] been virtually powerless…”  and that “in contrast 
to the UK [Germany] features strong regional governments…”. Moreover, Italy that performed a 
constitutional reform in 2001 to increase the power of regions (so called federalist reform) seems  
have achieved some result according to this index. 
 14
Once more, it is important to underline that this index (R) is still a very coarse measure. It 
does not consider many  relevant factor that play a crucial role in the allocation process. My 
purpose is only to suggest  a different way to think about this argument. The relevant point here is 
the simplicity of the approach used: point of strength and of weakness. Future researchs may 
“refine” this index using for example information regarding GDP or something else. 
Note that even when the index is inconsistent with results achieved in political literature on 
regional power, it is important too. In that case a question arise: why “powerful” regions lost 
financial resources in the bargaining process?  
 
5. Conclusions and remarks  
  
In this paper I have analysed the European model of governance with particular respect to 
the model that governs the regional policy. 
   From the vast available literature it is well known the importance of two strictly 
alternative models: the Multilevel Governance model and the State-Centric model. Both 
model use “political” consideration to shape the power of region (Sub-national actors) and 
Supra national actor. I introduced a diverse approach based on Public Choice framework as 
synthesis of the two different model.  
 This paper, instead, pointed to a numeric measure of the regional power considering 
the final result of the allocation process in term of total amount received by each state in the 
2000-2006 period and in the 2007-2013 period (prevision). Indeed, many structural change 
occurred in the EU regional policy as consequence of the enlargement in 2004, first,  and in 
2007 then. In this context EU15 Member State lost an important part of their previous 
financial aid from the EU. Nevertheless, the loss is very different across states. Starting 
from this empirical evidence I tried to use this different degree in loss to create as index of 
regional power in each state (R). The very simple index proposed is consistent with some 
political assertion (see for example Bomberg and Peterson (1998) about UK and Germany SNAs 
power).  
 It was underlined that this represent a very coarse measure, but the evidence of its 
coherence with some political -strictu  sensu – analysis may be an useful start point for further 
interdisciplinary analysis. When it is inconsistent with literature or political consideration, in 
general, it is useful to rise the question:  why “powerful” regions lost financial resources in the 
bargaining process?  
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 Obviously, this index is unable to answer the question. Some particular result may need a 
separate explanation and other relevant factor may be considered in the future in order to refine this 
measure.  
  The analysis has moved by the purpose to analyze in an "original" way  the existing 
relationship between  Nation state and SNAs and this purpose may be considered achieved, 
the many points of weakness of this method is not, in my view, a problem at this stage. 
 Finally, note that the interpretation of the achieved results is based, not only on 
models of governance in the political sense, but also on the economic point of view related 
to the efficiency. 
 In fact, according to the second generation of (fiscal) federalism we can argue as 
follows. Regional policy often has its final result in supply public goods. In a multi-level 
government setting, each level of government should seek to maximize the social welfare 
of its respective constituency7. Even if outputs of some local public goods (such as roads) 
can produce interjurisdictional spillover benefits, there might still be welfare gains from 
allowing decentralized provision relative to a centrally determined output. Moreover, 
competition among decentralized governments, much like competition in the private sector, 
can limit the capacities of a monopolist central government to increase its control over the 
economy’s resources offering significant gain of efficiency.  Put differently, a higher 
degree of regional power can led to a higher degree of efficiency in dealing  regional funds 
and, in turn, to an higher amount of financial resources allocated.  
 Both political and economic reasons are invoked to assert that the multilevel 
governance is preferable to state centric model of governance. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
7 At this purpose The Decentralization Theorem is clear: For a public good–the consumption of which is 
defined over geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of 
output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central or for the respective local government–it 
will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments to provide the Pareto-efficient 
levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified and 
uniform level of output across all jurisdictions (Oates, 2005) 
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